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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
"novel constitutional limitation" upon the state's power to enforce their con-
tracts. 14
According to construction by the courts in prior decisions this constitutional
limitation on the states to enforce their contracts .was imposed by the four-
teenth amendcment. ' The rule was laid down in Shelly v. Kraemer that the
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants by the courts is state action in
violation oif tho cqual protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.,; This
nle is generally accepted by the courts and the decision in the instant case
which follows it is neither new nor novel.17 Any other would have effectively
nullified the decision in Shelley v. Kraemer and denied to the negroes the
protection from discrimination which the framers of the fourteenth amend-
ment intended them to have.18
BAYARD LEwIs
CRIMINAL LAW - INDIANS - STATUTORY RAPE NOT A BASIS FOR JURISDIC-
TION UNDER TEN MAJOR CRIMES ACT - Defendant, a Menominee Indian, was
indicted by a federal grand jury for the statutory rape of an Indian girl on the
reservation. He moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the
federal court lacked jurisdiction to try him. It was held, that the motion
should be granted. The crime of rape enumerated in the Ten Major Crimes
Act, must be defined in accordance with the law of the state where the
crime is committed, and in Wisconsin, it does not include the carnal know-
ledge of a female under the age of consent. United States v. Jacobs, 113 F.Supp.
203 (E.D. Wis. 1953).
No federal court has jurisdiction to try an Indian for a criminal offense
committed on a reservation unless his crime is one covered by the so-called
Ten Major Crimes Act.2 The Act enumerates ten crimes considered offenses
if committed by one Indian against another on an Indian reservation. These
are murder, manslaughter, rape, incest, assault with intent to kill, assault
with a dangerous weapon, arson, burglary, robbery and larceny. Carnal know-
ledge, assault with intent to rape and assault with intent to do great bodily
harm were stricken from the Act as amended. Thus, these latter crimes are
no longer federal offenses with the meaning of the Act. In respect to the
crime of rape, the court will follow the law of the state where the crime was
committed.3 It is interesting to note, however, that as to the other crimes in
the Act, this is apparently not so, and the federal courts will disregard state
law and follow federal definitions or tribal law where they are concerned.
4
14. See Barrows v. Jackson, 73 S. Ct. 1013 (1953) (dissent).
15. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 17 (1948); Roberts v. Curtis, 93 F. Supp.
604 (D. D.C. 1950); see Correll v. Earley, 205 Okla. 366, 237 P.2d 1017, 1021 (1951).
16. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 17 (1948).
17. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1. 17 (1948); Roberts v. Curtis, 93 F. Supp.
604 (D. D.C. 1950); cf. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
18. See the discussion in Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (denying
negroes the right to vote in Democratic Party primary elections in Texas held violative of
fourteenth amendment); see also Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 77 (1917).
1. 47 Stat. 337 (1932). 18 U.S.C. 1548 (1946).
2. State v. District Court, 125 Mont. 398, 239 P.2d 272 (1951).
3. United States v. Jacobs, 113 F.Supp. 203 (E.D. Wis. 1953).
4. Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U.S. 542 (1909); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375 (1886); cf. Earle v. Godley, 42 Minn. 361, 44 N.W. 254 (1890).
RECENT CASES
The initial impetus behind the enactment of the Ten Major Crimes was an
early Dakota case which held that an Indian who murdered another Indian on
Indian land would be liable only to the local tribal courts. 5 This case invoked
such a storm of criticism that Congress, shortly thereafter, enacted the Seven
Major Crimes Act" which, through constant revision, became the Ten Major
Crimes Act.
The law of Wisconsin differentiates between rape and carnal knowledge
and abuse, or statutory rape of a female under the age of consent. 7 As noted
above, Congress expressly excluded the crime of statutory rape, as defined by
the law of the state where the offense was committed, from the scope of the Act.
An Indian is considered to be under the jurisdiction of the United States
as long as he continues to live on a reservation.' However, it is well-settled
that if an Indian commits a crime against another Indian or a white man while
off the reservation, he falls tnder the jurisdiction of the state in which the
crime was conmitted,1' since federal jurisdiction extends only to Indian reser-
vations and Indian lands, no distinction being made between the terms "reser-
vation" and "land" for practical purposes.' 0 This leads to a distinction between
"emancipated" and "unemancipated" Indians, the emancipated, or non- reser-
vation Indians being under the jurisdiction of the state as is any other citizen,
and the unemancipated or reservation Indian being under the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the federal government. In crimes committed by whites against Indians
on Indian lands and vice versa, the federal government retains exclusive juris-
diction."
The jurisdictional situations noted above concerning crimes committed by
and between the Indian and white races on or off Indian reservations and
land leave considerable latitude for hypothesis. What, for instance, would
happen if an Indian and a white man, walking together on an Indian reser-
vation, were accosted by a white man and robbed? It has already been stated
as a general proposition that crimes committed by whites against Indians on an
Indian reservation are punishable in the federal courts, the same being true as
relates to crimes committed by Indians against whites on Indian land.
However, it is noteworthy that if a white man commits a crime against a
white man, even though the two may be on Indian reservation at the time,
jurisdiction is in the state courts. 12 When applied to the above hypothesis,
5. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (4883).
6. 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885); 38 U.S.C. '24 (1946); Cohen, Handbook of Federal
Indian Law 362, 1945. (It is noteworthy that the tribes themselves'retain jurisdiction of
crimes committed on Indian lands by Indians against Indians when the crimes fall outside
the scope of the Act.)
7. Wisconsin Statutes 340.46, 340.47 (1949).
8. In re Long's Estate, 207 Oki. 259, 249 P.2d 103 (1952).
9. In re Wolf, 27 Fed. 606 (D.C. Ark. 1886); United States v. Kiya, 126 Fed. 879
(D. N.D. 1903); Ex parte Moore, 28 S.D. 339, 133 N.W. 817 (1911). (The first two
cited cases hold that the state has exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians
off the reservation only in the absence of a statute or treaty to the contrary. This is
evidently a broad construction of the well-settled rule that Congress has exclusive and
plenary power to legislate concerning Indians.)
10. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1912). (Indian country includes those
lands set aside for, or allotted to Indians, not previously occupied by them)
11. Donnelly v. United States, supra, note 10; State v. LaBarge, 234 Wis. 440, 291
N.W. 299 (1940).
12. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, (1882); 47 Stat. 337 (1932), 18
U.S.C. §548 (1946); 35 Stat. 329 (1909), 18 U.S.C. §549 (1946). Cohen, Handbook
of Federal Indian Law 365 (1945) (For purposes of jurisdiction over crimes committed by
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this creates an interesting situation. Is one to draw the conclusion from the
law as it now stands that the crime against the white man is an offense punis-
able in the state court while the crime against the Indian is punishable in the
federal courts? Such a conclusion as this would certainly lead one to view
that our jurispndence as to this question, is, to say the least, rather cumber-
some. Nevertheless, the answer to the question posed in the hypothesis above
is in the affinuative. The only situation where the state is allowed jurisdiction
of offenses on Indian land is in the case of crimes committed by whites against
whites thereon.-
Ilowever, federal jurisdiction over Indian affairs is not so broad and all-
encompassing as to rob the state of its police power in respect to Indians for
the mutual good of the state and the Indians themselves.14 A typical form of this
type of regulation may be found in state statutes prohibiting the sale of
beer or any form of hard liquor to Indians.-
In North Dakota, exclusive jurisdiction over Indian affairs has been ex-
pressly ceded to the federal government by constitutional provision."; Thus,
it is an open question whether the law in Wisconsin on this matter would apply
here, since a search of the Wisconsin statutes and constitution reveals no such
cession. It is, therefore, perfectly possibly that in North Dakota, the federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all crimes committed by Indians or
against Indians on Indian land, irrespective of the Ten Major Crimes Act.
However, it is arguable that since Congress may use its exclusive jurisdiction
at its discretion, the state may be said to have had jurisdiction over crimes
falling outside the scope of the Act ceded back to it.
The law on this entire question seems to represent a doubtful policy,
since legislative and judicial authority seem to have joined forces to form a
legalized discrimination against the Indian. It seems that much difficulty, both
on a legal and an ethical plane, might be avoided if Indians were treated
just as other citizens in respect to their legal rights. In the light of present-
day social policies, it seems unfortunate to categorize the Indian as "emanci-
pated" or "unemancipated." Society would be well rid of the latter classifica-
tion.
DOUGLAs BIRDZELL
one non-Indian against another on an Indian reservation, the reservation is generally
considered to be a part of the state where the crime was committed, and jurisdiction is
thus in the state. However, this does not hold true where the federal government has
expressly retained jurisdiction, the common case being when the crime falls within the
scope of the Ten Major Crimes Act.)
13. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1912) (The district courts of a territory
have jurisdiction over the crime of murder committed by any person other than an
Indian on an Indian reservation within its territorial limits.) Ex parte Konaha, 43
F. Supp. 747 (E.D. Wis. 1945) (Here, the court held that an Indian who negligently
struck and killed a pedestrian while driving on a state highway within the limits of an
Indian reservation was guilty of a misdemeanor within the meaning of the Ten Major
Crimes Act, and that the federal court had jurisdiction over the offense, since the granting
of a right of way to the state for construction of a highway over Indian land does not
extinguish the Indian title nor does it deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction.)
14. New York v. Dibble, 21 How. 366 (U.S. 1859).
15. N.D. Rev. Code 5-0210 (1943); "No person shall sell beer to a minor,
incompetent person, Indian, as defined by federal law, or a person who is an inebriate
or habitual drunkard." N.D. Rev. Code 5-0318 (1943). "No person shall sell any
liquor to a minor, incompetent person, Indian as defined by federal law, or a person who
is an inebriate or habitual drunkard."
16. N.D. Const. Art. XVI. t203 (2).
